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Openness and Economic Growth 
in Developing Countries 
 
Abstract 
Openness appears to have a strong impact on economic growth especially in DCs, 
which typically exhibit a high share of physical capital in factor income and a low 
share of labor. In the neoclassical growth model with partial capital mobility, physical 
capital's share in factor income determines the difference in the predicted convergence 
rates for open and closed economies. With a 60 percent share as in developing 
countries, the convergence rates should differ by a factor of about 2.5. My regression 
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The idea that openness is one of the most important determinants of economic growth 
is becoming increasingly popular among governments of developing countries (DCs). 
Casual observation seems to suggest that more or less outward oriented economies 
with few restrictions on international transactions have experienced a better economic 
performance than inward oriented economies with high tariff walls and strict controls 
of capital movements. Hence, market oriented economic policies, including the 
liberalization of international trade and capital flows, have been the centerpiece of 
recent reform efforts in parts of Latin America and South Asia. 
Regardless of the emerging consensus on the benefits of openness among policy 
makers in DCs, mainstream economists have always had some difficulties to provide 
the theoretical and empirical justification for the presumed positive link between free 
trade and capital flows and the rate of economic growth. For a start, it is easy to prove 
in theory that there are static economic gains from openness. Unfortunately, it is not 
straightforward to generalize from this result to a dynamic context. By definition, static 
gains from openness imply a level effect, not a growth effect. Of course, a level effect 
can appear as a growth effect for a given period of time, since adjustment in real 
                                                 
*  I thank Rolf J. Langhammer for helpful comments on an earlier version.   2
economies may take place over decades. However, the measured static gains of 
openness appear to be small in terms of GDP, according to most empirical estimates.1 
The dynamic gains from openness may be much larger. But identifying and measuring 
them obviously requires an alternative theoretical approach. The renewed interest in 
growth theory, mainly initiated by the seminal work of Romer (1986), seems to 
provide such an approach. So-called endogenous growth models allow for a direct and 
persistent link between openness and the growth rate, which is missing in the 
traditional neoclassical growth model (Solow 1956). E.g., Edwards (1992), Romer 
(1994), and Coe et al. (1995) use alternative endogenous growth models to explain a 
positive link between openness and the rate of economic growth as the result of the 
international diffusion and adoption of new technologies or new goods. Although 
convincing from a theoretical point of view, the major drawback of endogenous 
growth models is that they are difficult to reconcile with the growing body of empirical 
evidence on so-called conditional convergence.2 
                                                 
1  This point has been emphasized by Krugman (1990) for the case of the United States. For 
surveys with a focus on DCs, see, e.g., Lal and Rajapatirana (1987) and Havrylyshyn (1990). 
2  See, e.g., Dowrick and Nguyen (1989) and Gundlach (1993) for convergence across OECD 
countries; Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992) for convergence across U.S. states, European 
regions and Japanese prefectures; Jian et al. (1996) and Gundlach (1996) for convergence across 
Chinese provinces in the reform period; Bajpai and Sachs (1995) for convergence across Indian 
states; and Zini and Sachs (1996) for convergence across Brazilian states. For an overview, see 
Sala-i-Martin (1995).   3
Conditional convergence of per capita income is defined as the tendency for poor 
economies to grow faster than rich economies, once the determinants of their steady 
state are held constant. Contrary to endogenous growth models, conditional 
convergence of per capita income is predicted by the traditional neoclassical growth 
model. But this model also fails for empirical reasons: The actually observed rates of 
convergence in the range of 2 percent can only be explained if capital's share in income 
is about 75 percent and if economies are closed. However, capital's share in income is 
about 30 percent in OECD countries on average (Maddison 1987), and capital mobility 
is neither severely restricted across OECD economies nor within OECD economies. If 
so, adjustment to the steady state should be fast. Apparently, it is not. 
Therefore, Barro et al. (1995) suggest a neoclassical growth model for the open 
economy that allows for a relatively low rate of convergence in the presence of capital 
mobility. This model predicts that in adjusting to their steady state, open economies 
grow faster than closed economies. Open economies can acquire physical capital more 
quickly due to the availability of international financial markets. Hence, diminishing 
returns set in faster, and the speed of convergence to the steady state is higher. Yet for 
reasonable parameter values stemming from the U.S. economy, Barro et al. (1995) 
conclude that the speed of convergence is only marginally higher for open than for 
closed economies. Put differently, although capital mobility tends to raise the rate at  
   4
which poor open economies converge to their steady state, the quantitative impact of 
openness is held to be small, at least for industrialized countries. 
My empirical findings for DCs point to a different conclusion. Physical capital's share 
in factor income is the crucial parameter that determines the difference in the predicted 
convergence rates for open and closed economies. For a large number of DCs, physical 
capital's share is about 60 percent rather than 30 percent as in industrialized countries. 
With a 60 percent share, the convergence rates for open and closed economies should 
differ by a factor of about 2.5. Hence, openness appears to have a strong impact on 
economic growth especially in DCs, which typically exhibit a high share of physical 
capital in factor income and a low share of labor. My regression results for open and 
closed DCs roughly confirm this hypothesis. I find that holding constant other 
determinants of the steady state, open DCs converge at a rate of about 5 percent to the 
steady state, while closed economies converge at a rate of about 1.5 percent. 
2.  Convergence to the Steady State in Neoclassical Growth Models: Closed and 
Open 
Mankiw et al. (1992) develop a human capital augmented neoclassical growth model 
for the closed economy that takes the rates of saving, labor force growth and 
technological progress as exogenous. Output (Y ) is produced under constant returns to 
scale with three inputs, capital (K), human capital (H), and labor (L), which are paid   5
their marginal products. Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function, output at time 
t is given by: 
(1)  () YK HA L tt t t t =
−− α β α β 1  ,  0<α+β<1. 
A, the level of technology, and L are assumed to grow exogenously at rates g and n. 
Hence, the number of effective units of labor,  AL tt , grows at rate g + n. Assuming 
constant saving (sS Y ii = / ) and depreciation rates (δ = D/K = D/H), and defining k as 
the stock of physical capital per effective unit of labor (k = K/AL), h as the stock of 
human capital per effective unit of labor, and y as output per effective unit of labor (y 
= Y/AL), it can be shown that the evolution of k and h is governed by (Mankiw et al. 
1992)3 
(2a)  ( ) dk dt s y n g k k / =− + + δ  and 
(2b)  ( ) dh dt s y n g h h / =− + + δ  . 








































                                                 
3  In the following, I delete time subscripts for convenience of presentation.   6
Approximating around the steady state, the speed of convergence for the closed 
economy (λclosed ) can be derived as 
(4)  () () λ δ α β closed ng =+ + −− 1,  
where  α and β are the production elasticities of physical and human capital (see 
equation 1). According to the underlying assumptions of perfect competition and 
constant returns to scale, the production elasticities should equal physical and human 
capital's share in factor income. 
If the rate of converge actually is about 2 percent as estimated by most empirical 
studies,4 it follows that equation (4) can be used to infer an estimate for α β + , 
conditional on (ng + +δ ). The standard parameterization suggested in the literature is 
a rate of labor force growth of 1 percent, a rate of technological change of 2 percent, 
and a depreciation rate of 5 percent (Barro et al. 1995), so ng + +δ  equals 8 percent. 
If so, α β +  should be about 75 percent in order to explain a rate of convergence of 
about 2 percent. At least for the United States, the sum of the predicted factor shares 
has roughly been confirmed: Jorgenson et al. (1987) estimate that physical capital's 
share in factor income is about 30 percent, and human capital's share in factor income 
is about 50 percent. Hence, using a broad concept of capital that includes human 
                                                 
4  See footnote 2 for references; a rate of convergence of about 2 percent has also been estimated 
for a cross section of 75 countries (Mankiw et al. 1992).   7
capital cures one of the apparent empirical inconsistencies of the traditional 
neoclassical growth model (Solow 1956). 
The remaining problem for the human capital augmented neoclassical growth model 
arises from the implicit assumption of capital immobility. Capital immobility may or 
may not be a reasonable assumption in cross-country studies, but it is rather unlikely to 
hold across European regions or within countries such as the US, Japan, China, India, 
and Brazil.5 If capital mobility is perfect, adjustment to the steady state should be 
instantaneous; if capital mobility is high, convergence of per capita income should be 
rapid. Put differently, the observed convergence rates of about 2 percent are difficult to 
explain if capital is mobile, as it typically is at least within countries. 
Therefore, Barro et al. (1995) suggest the assumption of imperfect capital mobility to 
bridge the apparent gap between theory and empirical evidence. They assume that 
physical capital is mobile across economies, but human capital is not. That is, goods 
and capital are tradable among economies, but labor cannot migrate. Moreover, they 
assume that physical capital can be used as a collateral for international borrowing, 
whereas human capital cannot. This further assumption introduces an asymmetry 
between the two stocks of capital.  
Adjustment to the steady state level of physical capital will be fast due to the 
possibility of international borrowing, but adjustment to the steady state level of  
                                                 
5  For references, see footnote 2.   8
human capital will probably be slow. Hence physical and human capital are modeled 
as imperfect substitutes as inputs to production, and the relative size of the 
accumulated stocks of physical and human capital determines the fraction of broad 
capital that can be used as collateral. As it turns out, all these assumptions do not 
change the predicted steady state itself, but affect the rate of convergence. For the 
credit constrained open economy, the convergence rate is given by (Barro et al. 1995) 
(5)  () λδ
β
α



































The difference between the two convergence rates only depends on physical capital's 
share in income, which is the only mobile factor in the model. If physical capital's 
share in income is about 30 percent, which is the average for industrialized countries 
(Maddison 1987), the rate of convergence to the steady state is 1.5 times higher for the 
open economy than for the closed economy. Barro et al. (1995) argue that the 
quantitative impact of this difference is likely to be small, but such an interpretation 
deserves second thoughts. 
   9
Barro et al. (1995) predict a convergence rate of 1.4 percent for the closed economy 
and a convergence ate of 2.2 percent for the open economy, based on their 
parameterization of the model which relies on estimates for the U.S. economy. This 
theoretical result is largely in line with the empirical findings for convergence within 
countries, and for convergence across European regions and OECD economies. As 
indicated by equation (6), the relatively small difference between the two rates of 
convergence mainly reflects that physical capital's share in factor income is set to be 
about 30 percent. Nevertheless, even an apparently small difference in predicted 
convergence rates may reappear as a relatively large effect with regard to the time span 
necessary to close the gap between actual and steady state per capita income. That is, 
the Barro et al. (1995) results imply that the open economy would reach halfway to 
steady state more than half a generation (18 years) earlier than the closed economy.6 
Whether this effect of openness is small is not self-evident, to say the least. 
In any case, it should be noted that the effect of openness on the gap between actual 
and steady state per capita income will increase with physical capital's share in factor 
income. For example, if physical capital's share is about 60 percent, the convergence 
rate for the open economy is predicted to be 2.5 times higher than the convergence rate 
for the closed economy. Thus, openness matters especially for those economies that 
                                                 
6  Halfway to steady state is reached in t years according to t = ln (2)/λ, with λ as the convergence 
rate. Hence, if λ = 1.4 percent for the closed economy, t equals 49.5 years; if λ= 2.2 percent for 
the open economy, t equals 31.5 years.  10
exhibit a relatively high share of physical capital and a correspondingly low share of 
labor in factor income. Such a functional distribution of income is typical for DCs. 
3.  Capital's Share in Factor Income in Developing Countries 
I use National Accounts Statistics provided by the UN (1994) to calculate an average 
physical capital share in factor income for a large number of DCs. More specifically, I 
derive physical capital's share as consumption of fixed capital plus operating surplus, 
divided by GDP less indirect taxes plus subsidies. My final sample of DCs is limited 
for a number of reasons. Obviously, I can only include DCs which report detailed 
National Accounts Statistics to the UN. Furthermore, I exclude formerly socialist 
economies in Central and Eastern Europe and the successor states of the former Soviet 
Union. I also exclude DCs with a population of less than 1 million in 1992, DCs with 
less than three observations in 1980-92, and DCs with oil production as the dominant 
industry. Detailed results for average physical capital shares in factor income are 
presented in Table 1. 
The average physical capital share for developing countries is about 60 percent, with a 
standard error of 12.4. This figure is substantially higher than the average figure 
reported for samples of OECD countries (Pritchett 1996, Maddison 1987). The 
variation of physical capital's share in factor income across DCs is negatively  
  11
Table 1 — Average Shares of Physical and Human Capital in Factor Income, Selected Developing 
Countries, 1980-1992 
Country  Physical capital share
(percent) 
Human capital share 
(percent) 
Broad capital share 
(percent) 
Note: Real GDP per 
worker, 1990 (1985 
international prices)
Algeria  53.0  ..   -   12176 
Benin  77.8  ..   -   1903 
Bolivia  65.6 11.3 76.9  5315 
Botswana  64.6 23.5 88.1  6533a 
Burkina Faso  70.6  ..   -   1058 
Burundi  76.6  ..   -   1062 
Cameroon  68.2  ..   -   2489 
Chile  56.8 21.6 78.4  11854 
Colombia  55.6 26.6 82.2  10108 
Congo  61.2  ..   -   4497 
Costa  Rica  46.5 28.7 75.2  10040 
Ecuador  77.2 11.7 88.9  9032 
Honduras  49.0 24.3 73.3  4464 
Hong  Kong  48.0 29.6 77.6  22827 
Israel  42.1 21.9 64.0  23780 
Jamaica  47.6 27.6 75.2  5146 
Jordan  55.1  ..   -   12634 
Kenya  57.9 14.9 72.8  1863 
Korea,  Rep.  52.5 23.8 76.3  16022 
Malawi 75.9  6.9  82.8  1217 
Malaysia  60.4 13.7 74.1  12527 
Mauritius  51.9  ..   -   10198 
Mexico  68.6 17.0 85.6  17012 
Myanmar  56.7  ..   -   1362a 
Namibia  45.8  ..   -   9528 
Niger  81.3  ..   -   1043a 
Nigeria  79.2  ..   -   2082 
Nepal  41.1  ..   -   2298b 
Panama  47.5 30.3 77.8  7999 
Papua New Guinea  57.3  6.8  64.1  3020 
Paraguay  68.2 19.8 88.0  6383 
Peru  67.0 12.2 79.2  6847 
Philippines  64.7 15.5 80.2  4784 
Puerto Rico  53.5  ..   -   26137a 
Rwanda  74.4  ..   -   1539 
Sierra Leone   80.2  3.3  83.5  2487 
South  Africa  41.9 37.1 79.0  9595 
Sri  Lanka  47.2 16.1 63.3  5742 
Sudan  62.7  ..   -   2333 
Tanzania 84.4  4.0  88.4  1126c 
Thailand  71.5 18.8 90.3  6754 
Trinidad and Tobago  43.2  ..   -   19880 
Turkey  71.2  ..   -   8632 
Uruguay  54.1 18.9 73.0  11828 
Venezuela  63.6 15.4 79.0  17426 
Zambia  52.7  ..   -   2061 
Zimbabwe  41.6 14.5 56.1  2437 
Unweighted average  60.3 18.4 77.6  -   
Standard  error  12.4 8.4 8.4  -   
a1989; b1986 ; c1988. 
Sources:  PWT 5.6 (1994); UN (1994).  12
correlated with labor productivity: The statistically significant correlation coefficient is 
-0.49 for the log of the capital share and the log of real GDP per worker. That is, poor 
DCs tend to have a higher physical capital share than more advanced DCs. 
To check the plausibility of high estimates for physical capital's share in factor income, 
I also calculate human capital's share in factor income. For an average physical capital 
share of about 60 percent, the upper bound of human capital's share is 40 percent once 
unimproved labor does not receive any return. But obviously, unimproved labor also 
receives a return, so human capital's share in factor income can be expected to be 
lower than 40 percent in DCs. That is, if physical capital is internationally mobile but 
human capital is not, then the relative lack of human capital in DCs is the very reason 
for their relative backwardness. Hence it seems reasonable to presume that the poorer 
the country, the lower is human capital's share in income. This implication is 
confirmed by the results of cross-country regression analyses (Mankiw et al. 1992, 
Gundlach 1995) which show that human capital is at least as important as physical 
capital in explaining international income differences.  
Unfortunately, the calculation of human capital's share in factor income is not 
straightforward, because there is no National Accounts counterpart. One way to derive 
an estimate for human capital's share in the total wage bill is to focus on the rate of 
return to education and average years of schooling, thereby assuming that investment 
in education is the same thing as an increase in the stock of human capital. For   13
example, it would follow that investment in education raises income by a factor of 
three, if schooling is about 8 years on average and the social rate of return to secondary 
education is about 13 percent, where both figures represent worldwide averages 
(Psacharopoulos 1993). The derived multiplier of education in the range of three 
remains almost unchanged for different regions of the world, because the rate of return 
to education tends to decline with rising years of schooling: Sub-Saharan Africa comes 
up with a multiplier of 2.9, non-OECD Asia with 3.1, Latin America with 2.8, and the 
OECD with 3.0.7  
Hence, income is predicted to be about three times higher with human capital than 
without. As a result, human capital's share in the total wage bill should be about two 
thirds. Multiplying this figure with labor's total share in factor income gives the share 
of human capital in factor income. If labor's share in factor income is about 70 percent 
as in OECD countries, human capital's share can be expected to be about 45 percent; if 
labor's share in factor income is about 40 percent as in DCs, human capital's share can 
be expected to be about 25 percent. 
I use estimates of the social rate of return to education summarized by Psacharopoulos 
(1993) and average years of schooling from Barro and Lee (1993) to calculate human 
capital's share in factor income for some of the DCs listed in Table 1.8 For average 
                                                 
7  Calculated from Psacharopoulos (1993) as social rate of return to secondary education times 
average years of schooling, raised to the power of e. 
8  For the remaining DCs, rates of return to education are not reported in Psacharopoulos (1993).  14
years of schooling below 5 years, I use the social rate of return to primary education; 
for more than 5 years of schooling, I use the social rate of return to secondary 
education. In cases where the respective social rate of return to education is not 
available, I use Mincerian rates of return to education.9 The results are presented in the 
second column of Table 1. 
Overall, I find that human capital's share in factor income is only about one third of 
physical capital's share. Together, both shares account for about 80 percent of total 
factor income, i.e. 20 percent of total factor income may be accounted for by low-
skilled labor that does not receive a return for human capital. This result for a broad 
share of capital in the range of 80 percent is roughly in line with other empirical 
studies (Mankiw et al. 1992, Gundlach 1995, Pritchett 1996) and the standard 
parameterization used for the U.S. economy (Barro et al. 1995). But the relative weight 
of physical and human capital in DCs seems to be completely the reverse of the 
relative weight usually applied in the context of industrialized countries. This reversal 
of weights has strong implications for the implied rates of convergence for open and 
closed DC economies.
                                                 
9  The Mincerian rate of return to education can be interpreted as the average private rate of return 
to one additional year of education. I use this rate instead of the social rate of return for Kenya, 
Malaysia, Panama, Peru, and Sri Lanka.  15
4.  Openness and Convergence Reconsidered 
4.1 Theory 
Depending on the size of physical capital's share in factor income, the neoclassical 
growth model outlined in section 2 predicts different rates of convergence to the steady 
state (see equations (4) and (5)). This difference matters in quantitative terms because 
for reasonable parameterizations, the model also predicts that convergence to the 
steady state will evolve over a relatively long time period. That is, although openness 
does not change the model's steady state itself, it changes the implied convergence rate. 
As a result, open economies are predicted to realize substantial GDP gains within a 
shorter time period than closed economies. 
For instance, consider the standard parameterizations for the rate of technological 
change (2 percent) and the depreciation rate (5 percent), and an average rate of labor 
force growth of about 2 percent for low and medium income countries in 1980-1993 
(World Bank 1995). For average shares of physical and human capital in factor income 
of about 60 and 20 percent as reported in the last section, the model would predict that 
the closed economy will experience a convergence rate of 1.8 percent per year (see 
equation (4)). By contrast, in this case the open economy is predicted to experience a 
convergence of 4.5 percent per year (see equation (5)). 
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These findings have two main implications. First, for both convergence rates, the time 
period is fairly long until adjustment to the steady state is completed (Table 2). It 
would take about 50 years for the open economy to reach 90 percent of the steady state 
GDP, and the closed economy would only reach 60 percent of the steady state GDP 
after 50 years of adjustment. That is, economic policies that influence the 
accumulation of physical and human capital have more than a short run impact on the 
growth rate, because transition to the steady state will take place over decades, even in 
the open economy. If so, the observed positive correlation between investment rates 
and growth rates does not necessarily support the relevance of capital externalities 
(De Long and Summers, 1991); it can reasonably be explained as reflecting off-steady 
state behavior of the economy. 
Table 2 —  Theoretical  Adjustment  to  the Steady State for Open and Closed 
Economies (percent) 
  Adjustment to the steady state (percent) 
Years Open  economy 
(λopen  = 4.5 percent) 
Closed economy 
(λclosed  = 1.8 percent) 
5 20.1 8.6 
15 49.1  23.7 
38 81.9  49.5 
50 89.5  59.3 
100 98.9  83.5 
Note: The percentage of the steady state achieved for a given convergence rate (λ ) after t years is
given by  () [] 11 − / e t λ . 
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Second, a large portion of the adjustment to the steady state occurs within a relatively 
short time period, at least for the open economy. The open economy will reach 
halfway to steady state (50 percent) in about 15 years, while the closed economy will 
reach halfway to steady state in about 38 years (Table 2). Put differently, the open 
economy will reach halfway to steady state in about one generation earlier than the 
closed economy. As is self-evident, one would predict other time spans for other 
parameterizations of technological change, depreciation, and labor force growth. But, 
if physical capital's share in factor income is about 60 percent in a typical DC, it 
matters whether this country is open or not: independent of other variables, the two 
convergence rates will differ by a factor of 2.5 (see equation (6)).  
This difference is large. For example, the open economy will reach a GDP level that is 
about twice as high as the GDP level of the closed economy after 15 years of transition 
to the steady state (see Table 2). Since both economies converge to the same steady 
state, this difference must decline over time. Still, even after five decades of transition 
to the steady state, the open economy will lead in terms of GDP by more than 30 
percent compared to the closed economy. Hence at least in theory, it seems to follow 
that especially DCs can gain a lot from policies of external liberalization. 
4.2 Empirical  Evidence 
If the theory underlying the neoclassical model is correct, those DCs that tend to be 
more open should have experienced a better growth performance, i.e. a higher rate of  18
convergence to the steady state. One major difficulty for checking the plausibility of 
the model is to find an appropriate empirical measure of openness. Several measures 
have been suggested in the literature. 
For a start, measures focusing on export performance as an indicator of openness 
(World Bank 1993) are problematic, for two reasons. The export share in output tends 
to be endogenous with regard to output growth, and it tends to decline with country 
size. Put differently, output growth may cause an increase in the output share of 
exports rather than the other way round, and such an increase is more likely to happen 
in small countries than in large countries. The Dollar index of openness (Dollar 1992), 
focusing on a country's relative price level in tradable goods, has been criticized for 
being a measure of real exchange rate divergence, which lacks credibility as a measure 
of openness. For instance, an increase in trade restrictions can move the Dollar index 
in either direction (Rodrik 1994). Other measures of openness, focusing on the absence 
of export or import quotas and a black-market premium over the official exchange rate 
(Sachs and Warner 1995), are somewhat difficult to reconcile with the concept of 
openness used in the neoclassical growth model outlined in section 2. This model 
identifies capital mobility as the decisive indicator of openness. However, the link 
between capital mobility and the absence or presence of quotas and black-market 
premiums is not straightforward: net capital flows have been surprisingly low between  
  19
countries with fairly liberal trade regimes and undistorted exchange rates (Feldstein 
and Horioka 1980). 
Feldstein and Horioka measure the degree of international capital mobility by a 
regression of the investment share on the saving rate. The resulting so-called savings 
retention coefficient measures that fraction of an increase in domestic savings that ends 
up as domestic investment. If the savings retention coefficient equals 1, the economy is 
completely closed because an increase in domestic saving would lead to an identical 
increase in domestic investment. By contrast, if the savings retention coefficient equals 
0, the economy is completely open because all additional domestic saving would end 
up as foreign investment. 
Montiel (1994) uses the Feldstein-Horioka approach in a time series context and finds 
a surprisingly high degree of capital mobility in his sample of DCs. Choosing from a 
number of alternative specifications, his most preferred results indicate that out of a 
sample of 57 DCs, 33 can be considered as open and nine can be considered as closed, 
while the remaining cases remain statistically indecisive.10 These results seem to be 
fairly robust, since a number of factors are controlled for which may cause a potential 
downward bias in the estimated saving retention coefficient. Such factors are the 
possible impact of development aid, the potential endogeneity of the saving rate, and 
the specific time series properties of the data. 
                                                 
10 See Montiel (1994, Table 3, columns 3 and 6).  20
Unfortunately, Montiel's sample includes countries which do not provide detailed 
National Accounts Statistics that allow for a calculation of physical capital's share in 
factor income. I delete these countries from Montiel's sample of open and closed 
economies to control for data quality. My resulting sample consists of 13 open and 9 
closed DCs. The DCs in Table 1 that can be identified as open according to Montiel's 
results11 are Benin, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Malaysia, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Sierra Leone, and Uruguay; the DCs that can be 
identified as closed are Honduras, Kenya, Malawi, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, the 
Philippines, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. For this sample of 22 DCs, I estimate the two 
rates of convergence for open and closed economies. 
Mankiw et al. (1992) show that based on the production function given in equation (1), 
the rate of convergence (λ) can be estimated by regressing the log difference of output 
per worker at time t and some initial date 0 on the determinants of the steady state and 
the initial level of output. Augmenting such an equation by a slope and a level dummy 
for openness, I get 
                                                 
11 Montiel (1994) suggests a benchmark value of 0.6 for the estimated savings retention coefficient 
to decide whether an economy is open or closed. Whenever his IV-estimate is close to 0.6, I use 
his OLS-estimate to decide whether an economy should be classified as open or closed.  21
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where c is a regression constant, ∆K Y /  is investment in physical capital, and ∆H Y /  
is investment in human capital, both expressed as shares in output. OPEN is a level 
dummy which equals 1 for open DCs and 0 otherwise, SLOPEN is a slope dummy 
which equals initial income for open DCs and 0 otherwise. All other variables and 
parameters are defined as before. 
Investment in human capital as a share of output (∆H Y / ) is measured as the 
percentage of the working age population that is in secondary school, and taken from 
Mankiw et al. (1992). All other variables are taken from Summers and Heston (1991): 
Output per worker (Y/L) is real GDP per worker in 1985 international prices, 
investment in physical capital as a share of output (∆K Y / ) is real gross domestic 
investment as a share of real GDP in 1985 international prices, and n is the implicit 
growth rate of the labor force derived from measures of real GDP and real GDP per 
worker. Time t is 1985, time 0 is 1960. 
With only 22 observations at hand, a regression based on the specified convergence 
equation would result in a serious degrees of freedom problem. Therefore, I restrict the  22
convergence equation according to the empirical results in Mankiw et al. (1992, Tab. 
VI, intermediate sample) as 
(8)  () ( ) ln / ln / YL YL t − 0 ( ) ( ) [ ] −− + + 0 506 .l n/ l n ∆KY ngδ  
  () ( ) [] −− + + 02 6 6 .l n/ l n ∆HY n gδ  
  () () =−− + − − ceY L O P E N S L O P E N t 1 0
λ γ ln / . 
That is, my regression equation uses the conditional growth rate as the new dependent 
variable. The conditional growth rate controls for differences among DCs in the two 
rates of factor accumulation and in the rate of labor force growth, which together 
determine the steady state. With this approach, I estimate the following regression 
coefficients and the implied rates of convergence (standard errors in parentheses): 
Conditional growth rate = 2.53 + 3.62 OPEN – 0.31  ( ) ln / YL 0 – 0.41 SLOPEN 
 (0.73)  (1.09)  (0.09)  (0.13) 
Number of observations: 22 
R2 = 0.76    s.s.e. = 0.22 
Implied λopen
DC  :  0.051 
 (0.013) 
Implied λclosed
DC  :  0.015 
 (0.006) 
  23
My empirical findings for the two rates of convergence confirm the difference between 
open and closed economies predicted by the neoclassical model of economic growth: 
Open DCs converge at a much higher rate to their steady state than closed DCs.12 For 
DCs with physical capital's share in factor income of about  60 percent and human 
capital's share in factor income of about 20 percent, the model predicts a convergence 
rate of 4.5 percent for the open economy and of 1.8 percent for the closed economy. 
My point estimates closely resemble this prediction. Put differently, although openness 
does not change the steady state itself, it considerably shortens the time period until the 
steady state is reached. Taking the point estimates for the two convergence rates 
literally, the open economy would reach halfway to steady state in about 33 years 
earlier than the closed economy. Even after five decades of transition to the steady 
state, the open economy would lead in terms of GDP by about 40 percent compared to 
the closed economy. 
Summarizing, openness along with factor accumulation matters for economic growth, 
especially in DCs. In qualitative terms, this finding may not come as a surprise. The 
                                                 
12 See Sachs and Warner (1995) for a similar result. They also report that open DCs show-higher-
than average growth, and therefore convergence. However, their empirical results are difficult to 
reconcile with the model they use. First, their estimated regression coefficients on initial income 
either do not allow for a calculation of the convergence rate (their Table 4) or imply an 
inconsistent convergence rate of about 9.6 percent (their Table 5). Second, the impact of 
openness is measured by a level dummy, although the underlying model suggests to measure the 
impact of openness by a slope dummy.  24
surprise is the quantitative importance of openness for the convergence rate, and hence 
the growth rate.  25
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